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1. Introduction
In this paper, we explore a dynamic-eﬃciency rationale for public health spending on the young.
Health experts and economists have identified two economic rationales — broadly classified as en-
hancing “static eﬃciency” — for public involvement in health. First, some actions that promote
health — vaccinations, smoking-cessation programs, and so on — are public goods or generate con-
siderable positive externalities, and hence, would be underprovided by private markets. Second,
market failures of all sorts, both in the provision of care and in health insurance, may justify govern-
mental intervention.1 Add to that list, equity concerns: health aﬀects productivity and well-being,
and the poor, unable to aﬀord much health care, may remain stuck in poverty. Health care is a
basic service essential in any eﬀort to combat poverty, and as such, public funds may be needed
to help achieve that aim. This paper addresses the following issue: setting aside the “static eﬃ-
ciency” rationales and distributional concerns (and assuming perfect capital markets), can dynamic
eﬃciency considerations justify public investment in health?
The presence of the government in matters relating to overall health is huge. The United States
government currently spends roughly 7% of its G.D.P on health care. The W.H.O estimates, on
average, governments spend 4.6% of their country’s G.D.P on health, the figure being as low as 1%
in South Asia and as high as 8% in Western Europe. The World Development Report, Investing
in Health (1993), documents that nearly 60% of world spending on health is disbursed via public
health programs. Ignoring medical research, public involvement in health involves three sorts of
investments, those in preventive, palliative, and curative care. Preventive medicine or preventive
care refers to measures taken to prevent illnesses (and thereby, promote longevity and general
good health) rather than curing them (curative care) or treating their symptoms (palliative care).
Generally speaking, the relative importance of one kind of care over others, changes over the life
cycle. Preventive health interventions typically happen early on in a life-cycle and are mostly
intended to reduce subsequent morbidity and mortality risk.2 In the United States, nearly half of
the nation’s spending for personal health care goes to people aged 44 and below. It is impossible
1To this list, it is possible to add one more rationale — complementarities between private and public eﬀorts
to improve health; if such complementarity is strong (say, smokers are more likely to quit if their own eﬀort is
supplemented by government-run, smoking-cessation programs), it is again relatively easy to justify governmental
intrusion in health.
2Preventive interventions are not restricted to vaccinations for infants and children; many aﬀect the lives of adults
late into life. Clinical preventive services include screening for high risk conditions, such as elevated blood lead levels,
elevated blood pressure, and elevated serum cholesterol; management of certain communicable diseases, especially
sexually transmitted diseases and tuberculosis; and counseling to reduce risky behaviors. Preventable causes of death,
such as tobacco smoking, poor diet and physical inactivity, and alcohol abuse is responsible for nearly 40% of total
yearly mortality in the United States.
Publicly-funded preventive health investments, such as counseling adults to quit smoking, screening for colorectal
cancer, and providing influenza and other vaccinations, have been shown to have reduced mortality at very low cost.
Public smoking-prevention eﬀorts in the United States over the past three decades have been estimated to have saved
33 million person-years of life. See Gordon et. al (1996) for details.
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to point to an exact figure for the share of public resources directed to preventive health care or,
more generally, to publicly-funded health care directed toward the younger generations.
The World Development Report (1993) argues that public action has contributed immensely
to producing remarkable improvements in life expectancy, sharp reductions in child and adult
mortality, and considerable increases in the disability-adjusted life years for many around the
world. And yet, even as it endorses public health intervention, the report goes on to point out
that “what people do with their lives [...] aﬀects their health far more than anything governments
can do”. Given the sheer size of governmental involvement in health and the cautionary wrinkle
introduced in the previous line, a broad question arises, should a government invest in health even
when private agents are up to the task?
We pose versions of this question within the confines of a simple, two-period overlapping gen-
erations model of endogenous mortality and morbidity developed in the spirit of Grossman (1972),
Ehrlich and Chuma (1990) and Philipson and Becker (1998).3 In the model economy, young agents
invest a portion of labor income in their own health. Such preventive investments serve to reduce
subsequent mortality risk and old-age morbidity; they also improve general well-being, ability to
work, even earnings potential, later in life.4 We study the rationale of introducing a public-health
program that tops up private health investment by the young and is financed by a distortionary
tax on old (and young) labor income under a pay-as-you-go scheme. Perfect substitutability of
private and public investment in health is assumed, and all the aforementioned static-eﬃciency
justifications for public health are assumed away. In addition, perfect capital markets, including
competitive, mortality-contingent claims (“life-annuity”) markets, are assumed to exist.
To build intuition, first consider a benchmark setting with exogenous mortality risk. In this
stripped-down economy, and under complete generality, we prove that introducing publicly-funded
preventive health spending on the young is welfare-improving if the economy is initially dynam-
ically eﬃcient. (For our purposes, dynamic eﬃciency refers to a steady-state situation in which
the gross real interest rate in an economy — the private opportunity cost of funds over time — is
higher than the population growth rate, the corresponding social opportunity cost.) The result is
derived for a reverse pay-as-you-go scheme that relies on past beneficiaries being taxed so that an
intergenerational transfer mechanism (going from the old to the young) is active. The underlying
intuition is that while the benefit of the public investment accrues to the young — among other
things, it allows them to reduce their own private investments in health — its cost is borne by the
3For analyses of infectious dieases and health activites in OG models in the presence of external eﬀects and capital
market imperfections respectively, see e.g. Momota et. al (2005) and Augier and Yaly (2011).
4Private investment in one’s health stock may include annual diagnostic health screening, opportunity cost of
regular exercise, taking vitamins and nutrients, eating nutritious food, health benefits from quitting unhealthy habits,
such as, smoking, and so on.
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old, partially or wholly. Since these taxes represent intergenerational transfers from the old to
the young, the private opportunity cost of investment by the young is the interest rate, while the
social opportunity cost of public investment is one (if the old pay for it entirely, and there is no
population growth). In a dynamically-eﬃcient economy, the former exceeds the latter, making the
public option attractive at the margin.5
Next, we study a setting in which mortality risk is endogenous; in particular, young-age health
investments reduce subsequent mortality risk. In Philipson and Becker (1988), the availability
of mortality-contingent claims increases the incentive of agents to invest in their health, which
in turn, increases their longevity. As originally noted by Davies and Kuhn (1992), moral hazard
arises when such longevity-inducing behavior is undertaken without internalizing its eﬀect on the
premium paid by others. It follows, from society’s standpoint, when mortality-contingent claims
are present, private agents overinvest in their health. We call this the “Philipson-Becker eﬀect”.
Evidently, when this eﬀect is present, simple dynamic eﬃciency is no longer enough to make the
case for public health. Indeed, the discussion gets more nuanced because the net asset position of
agents starts to matter. To see this, consider a setting in which an increase in public health spending
raises overall health spending even after the crowding out of private spending is accounted for. Such
action reduces overall mortality risk, and hence, the interest rate on life annuities. This helps the
young, if they are net borrowers, by easing their interest burden from past borrowing. It follows,
from a societal perspective, the Philipson-Becker eﬀect implies young net-borrowers under invest in
their own health. And public health can correct for this private underinvestment.6 In this case, the
Philipson-Becker eﬀect works in tandem with dynamic eﬃciency to support a role for public health.
It bears emphasis that the importance of the net asset position of agents has not been highlighted,
heretofore, in the literature.
Our paper fits well in a short line of research — starting with Davies and Kuhn (1992) and
continued in Philipson and Becker (1998) and Liu, Rettenmaier, and Saving (2005) — on the moral
hazard issue in annuity markets. Philipson and Becker (1998) analyze a model similar in many
respects to ours, but unlike us, they study a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension (one that taxes the
young and transfers a lump-sum to each of the surviving old). The fact that payment of the pension
benefit is contingent on survival converts the pension into something like an annuity — in fact, they
5This result mirrors the classic Aaron-Samuelson result (Aaron, 1966) in pension economics. In that context,
introducing a pay-as-you-go pension (funded by a lump-sum tax on the young) is welfare reducing if the economy
is dynamically eﬃcient. The upshot of the Aaron-Samuelson result is that in a dynamically-eﬃcient economy, it is
a bad idea to save via the pension system — the intergenerational transfer mechanism, going from the young to the
old, hurts welfare. Our value added is to recognize that since saving via this transfer mechanism is bad, borrowing
via the same scheme has to be good.
6 In the model of Schneider and Winkler (2010), agents under invest in healthcare, as they fail to take into account
that increased longevity in the aggregate induces a positive eﬀect on the economy’s growth rate.
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term social security as a “mandatory annuity program”. Most importantly, though, the survival
probability in their setup depends only on private health investments and not on anything that is
publicly financed. They find that a more generous pension distorts private investments in health;
it induces people to want to live longer. This causes private saving to go up, a result that goes
against the standard intuition that pensions crowd out private saving and are welfare-reducing if
the economy is dynamically eﬃcient. Interestingly, Philipson and Becker (1998) consider a world
with zero net interest and zero population rates of growth; in eﬀect, their focus is restricted to the
golden rule.
An important contribution is Zhang, Zhang, and Leung (2006) who extend Philipson and Becker
(1998) by including production and allowing for two kinds of health investments, the kind the young
make to reduce mortality risk and those made by the middle-aged to lengthen their working life.
However, their focus, like that in Philipson and Becker (1998), is entirely on the general-equilibrium
eﬀects of a PAYG pension. Johannson (2000) studies insurance against health needs when old
(curative and palliative) and not on preventive health investments activities as young — indeed,
health status as old is not aﬀected in any way by decisions made as young. Assuming perfectly
inelastic labor supply and no private health insurance, he argues, based on steady-state welfare, the
need for introducing PAYG health care, provided the old contribute to its financing. He goes on to
compare a marginal introduction of private versus public health insurance (starting from an initial
situation without any form of insurance) near the Golden rule and finds in favor of the private. We
view Johannson (2000) as being complementary to the current paper.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the model setup is presented and
an equilibrium is defined. Section 3 contains our main results concerning the optimality of public
health investments, both for the case of exogenous and endogenous mortality. Section 4 concludes.
Proofs of all the main results are contained in the appendix.
2. The model
2.1. Primitives. Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of (potentially)
two-period lived agents who are identical at birth. To keep the structure manageable, we merge the
full life-cycle for individuals into two periods, denoted young and old. The young-age period may
be thought of as youth and early adulthood combined, and the old, as mature adult and retired
combined. Each agent is endowed with one unit of time in each period of life, i.e., both when young
and when old. There is a single consumption good whose price is normalized to one. Agents are
assumed to care about consumption and leisure in each period of life; in addition, they derive utility
from their level of health when old. An agent survives onto the second period with probability 
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When young, an agent can undertake preventive health investments designed to influence .7
The expected lifetime utility of an agent is given by
( 1− ) +  ( 1−  ) (1)
where the subscript  denotes “young” and  denotes “old” and  (·) is a standard, concave felicity
function defined on consumption when young () and leisure (1− ), where  is labour supply.
Likewise,  is a standard, concave felicity function specified over consumption when old (), leisure
(1 − ), and stock of health when old (). Note that utility as old under non-survival has been
normalized to zero and   0. Also, additive separability of utility is a convenient simplification;
the thrust of our results is immune to the dropping of that assumption. Similarly, adding in an
exogenously-specified discount rate in (1) has no qualitative consequences.
The assumption that old-age health status () influences felicity incorporates diﬀerent ef-
fects of morbidity on well-being: the marginal utility of consumption
¡ Q 0¢ and of leisure¡1−  Q 0¢ may depend on health. The former captures the idea that pre-requisites for the
enjoyment of consumption may depend positively or negatively on one’s health. The latter,¡1−  Q 0¢  allows for the possibilities that a) better (worse) health may increase (decrease)
the utility from time-consuming leisure activities (such as, travel) and b) decrease (increase) the
disutility from work eﬀort by making it easier (harder) to overcome the physical and physiological
demands of the job.
An agent’s health status when old is assumed to depend on health-specific investments made
when young.8 These can be private — expenditure on items over which one has direct control,
such as exercise, diet, vaccinations, preventive care, regular check-ups, protection against sexually-
transmitted diseases, smoking cessation, and the like. Or these can be public, incorporating almost
any public health expenditure that directly aﬀects private health, such as expenditure on vacci-
nations, smoking-cessation programs, the building of public hospitals that provide pre- and post
operative care, and so on. We remain agnostic as to the precise nature of such investments. All we
require is that the investments be made in the first period of life, and private agents, when making
their own decisions, take the public investment as given.
We measure health expenditures in terms of consumption possibilities foregone for the sake of
investment in health. Denote by  the amount of private health investment, and by  the level of
7 In general, with heterogeneous individuals, the average mortality risk must be distinguished from an individual’s
mortality risk. Here, because all young are identical, in equilibrium, they each make the same level of investment,
and hence, the economy-wide mortality risk () coincides with that of any individual.
8Health investments by the old are disregarded so as to focus mainly on mortality-reducing preventive investments.
Moreover, public health investments on the old are akin to public pensions which have been extensively studied in
the literature.
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public investment. Private and public investments in health are assumed to be perfect substitutes ;
hence, total health investment is given by  ≡  + . The assumption of perfect substitutability
between private and public investments in health is made so as to not bias the results in favor of
public health activities.9 As will be evident, in equilibrium  will respond to  and may even get
crowded out; in that event, a matter of some concern will be whether  goes up or down.
Health investments made when young are assumed to aﬀect both the survival probability (mor-
tality) and the stock of old-age health capital (morbidity). The survival probability is assumed
to depend on health investment, i.e.,  ≡ () where 0   ≤ 1  ≥ 0 and 
2
2 ≤ 0 holds.
Similarly, we have that old-age health stock is given by  ≡ () where  ≥ 0 and 
22 ≤ 0
holds. Increased morbidity is equivalent to a decline in 
Agents are assumed to earn an exogenously-specified wage of  in the first period of life. We
allow for the possibility that earnings potential depends on health status so that the wage of the
old is given by  ≡ () where  ≤   ≥ 0 and 
22  0.
Denote aggregate saving by , and by , the gross, riskless return on funds between any
two periods. We assume perfect capital mobility, and hence,  is exogenously determined. Since
agents face survival risk, being risk averse, they seek insurance. We posit all agents have access
to, and exclusively use, both for borrowing and for saving, zero-cost intermediaries who operate in
competitive, perfect annuity markets (as in Yaari, 1965); then the return to saving (or interest on
borrowing) is ˜ where ˜ = 10’11Evidently, it will be important to note that private agents do
not internalize the eﬀect of  on  something the government does. For future reference,   1
corresponds to dynamic eﬃciency,  = 1 refers to the Golden rule, and   1 implies dynamic
ineﬃciency; see Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
The government funds public health investments, but no pension, via a distortionary tax 
(0 ≤   1) on young and old income. We assume the government operates under a balanced-
budget requirement on a period-by-period basis, and is not permitted to borrow on the international
9There are plenty of examples of perfectly substitutable health activities; consider equally-good private and public
hospitals coexisting, or governments handing out free smoking-cessation tools to smokers or condoms to those who
visit sex workers, when those items may be bought at a private cost on the market, and so on. Perfect substitutability
is, of course, an extreme assumption; it only makes it harder to rationalize the public component, the subject matter
of this paper.
10On the borrowing side, we assume private agents rely on funds from risk-neutral, competitive banks that borrow
on the international market at the rate  and, given the mortality risk, lend domestically to young borrowers at rate
˜ so as to break even. We (implicitly) assume that surviving borrowers cannot renege on paying back their debt.
11On the matter of exclusive use of annuities for transferring income across time, Davidoﬀ, Brown and Diamond
(2005) argue that rational risk-averse agents with access to both annuities and bonds, should save mostly via annuities.
They also consider cases where a sudden medical need may arise at some point — a standard annuity does not provide
insurance against such an event. If the contract does not provide insurance against such events, it may be optimal
to save partly in bonds. In our case, health investment is a preventive activity and no such “health events” occur.
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market. The government budget constraint reads
 =  + (·) ()  (2)
For simplicity (and for realism), we assume the income tax rate is age-independent. Also note no
claim is being made that such a tax is part of an optimal tax structure. To foreshadow, it will be
important that the old contribute to the tax pool, i.e., some of the revenue needed to pay for public
health investments on the young is raised from the old.
2.2. Agent’s problem. The agent takes the tax rate (), the public level of health investment
(), and the rate of return on annuities (˜) as given. (In contrast, as discussed below, the
policymaker will recognize the connection between  and (2); in addition, she will internalize the
eﬀect of her choices on (·) and hence on ˜) The per-period budget constraints facing an agent
are as follows:
 = [1−  ] −  − 
 = [1−  ] + ˜
The agent’s problem is to choose    and  by maximizing (1) subject to these budget
constraints, and the usual non-negativity constraints.  is allowed to be positive (saving) or
negative (borrowing).
The only decision facing the surviving-old is how much labor to supply (). Define
 (    ˜) ≡ max ([1−  ] ()  + ˜ 1−  ())
Noting  is pre-determined, the first order condition to this problem (at an interior) reads
(·) [[1−  ] ()]− 1−(·) = 0 (3)
and the second order condition is given by
(·) [[1−  ] ()] + (1−)(1−)(·)  0
The salient properties of the indirect utility function  are noted below:
 =  (·)  +  (·) [1−  ]
∙
  +  ()


¸ 
 − 1− (·)




=
½
(·) + (·) [1−  ]  
¾ 
  0
 = ˜ (·)  0
 = − (·) ()   0
˜ =  (·)  Q 0
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where (3) has been used. For future use, note from the expression for ˜ that the size and sign
of  matters, as is to be expected. This will be important because changes in public health
investment will aﬀect ˜ and hence utility, and the eﬀect will depend on the size and sign of  In
particular, if  is negative (the young are net borrowers), then ˜  0 holds; in this case, a rise in
 (subsequent to an increase in ) reduces ˜ and this helps the borrower (since the interest due
on her past borrowing is now lower).
The young decide on labor supply, savings and health investments by maximizing expected life
time utility:
max

 ¡[1−  ] −  −  1− ¢+ () (    ˜)
subject to the aforementioned budget constraints, taking the tax rate (), the level of public health
investment (), and the rate of return (˜) as given. Even though  (·) is assumed to be concave
in its arguments, it is by no means obvious that () ·  (    ˜) is concave too.
Assumption 1 () ·  (    ˜) is strictly concave in  and 
In that case, the first order conditions for this problem (interior) are given by:
 : (·) [(1− )]− 1−(·) = 0 (4)
 : −(·) + (·)(·) = 0
⇔ −(·) +(·) = 0 (5)
 : −(·) +
∙(·)
  (·) + (·)(·)
¸ 
 = 0 (6)
⇔ −(·) + 
½
(·) + (·) (1− )  
¾ 


 +
(·)
  (·)

 = 0
Since  = 1 (public and private health investments are perfect substitutes), the first order condi-
tion for private health investment reduces to
(·) = 
½
(·) + (·) (1− )  
¾ 
 +
(·)
  (·) (7)
The second order conditions for this problem are straightforward but tedious to write; henceforth,
we assume they hold.
The interpretation of the first order optimality conditions for labor supply and saving is stan-
dard. The one for private health investment is as follows. An unit of the good invested in one’s
health reduces current felicity because it is no longer available for current consumption. On the
plus side, such an investment has future benefits in the form of reduced mortality
³(·)

´
and
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reduced morbidity
¡(·)¢ ; not to mention, the change in total health investment brought about
by the unit increase in private investment,
³

´

An equilibrium with coexistence of private and public health investment is defined a 3-tuple
(  ) ∈ <3++ with  ∈ (0 1)   ∈ (0 1) that solves (4), (5), (7), (3), satisfies the relevant
second-order conditions and the public sector budget constraint (2). An equilibrium with only
private health investment is defined as above except it has  =  = 0 An equilibrium with only
public health investment is defined as above except it has  = 0 and   0 We assume all such
equilibria exists.
3. A rationale for public investment in health?
We wish to know whether there is a welfare rationale for a policymaker to make publicly-funded
investments in health (as a top-up on existing private investments). In our setting, the prima facie
presumption has to be in the negative; after all, public and private health investments are assumed
to be perfect substitutes, and the former is financed via a distortionary tax.
Consider a policy maker deciding on public health investments, . The public sector budget
constraint (2) implies that the tax rate needed to finance this investment is
 = 

 + (·) ()   (8)
We think of public health expenditures () as the policy instrument, and therefore, under this
interpretation, the tax rate is determined endogenously from (8).
A bit of detour on the tax-base eﬀects of public health investment is in order. A change in
public health investment has two direct eﬀects on the tax base. It influences the survival probability
thereby drawing in more to the tax base from the elderly. It also aﬀects the health stock of agents
and that aﬀects their income. The combined eﬀect on the income tax base, via its eﬀect on the
government’s budget balance, aﬀects the income tax rate, and thus the distortionary eﬀects on
labor supply, etc. To see this, use (8) to derive
(·)
 =
1
 + (·) () −

  (·) + (·) () 
(·)
 + (·)
()
 +  () 
(·)



[ + (·) () ]2 
which, using (8) and upon re-organization and simplification, yields the following expression for
the tax elasticity:
(·)


 = 1−
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(·)
(·)
| {z }
young labor distortion
+
(·)(·)
(·)
| {z }
old labor distortion
+
(·)(·) ()| {z }
wage eﬀect
+
(·)(·)

| {z }
mortality eﬀect
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
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(9)
Even when labor supply is exogenous, that is the indirect labor distortion terms in (9) drop out,
two direct eﬀects remain: a) more public investment in health reduces morbidity and hence, the
wages of the old increase (an important element of the tax base), b) more people survive to old
age, further helping the tax base.
The policymaker is utilitarian, caring equally about the lifetime welfare of every two period-lived
generation.12The problem of the policy maker is described as
max

Υ ≡  ¡[1− (·)] −  −  1− ¢+ () (    ˜)
where the equilibrium value of  is determined by (4),  by (5),  by (6), the tax rate  follows
from the budget constraint (8), and it is recognized that ˜ = () Private agents make their
choices taking the government’s involvement as given; in turn, the latter makes its choices taking the
private responses into account. The marginal welfare eﬀect of a change in public health investment
is captured by:
Υ
 = −(·)
 (·)
 +
£(·) [1−  (·)] − 1− (·)¤ 
+
£−(·) +(·)¤ 
+
∙
−(·) + (·)  (·) +  (·)− ˜ (·)

2
(·)

¸ 

+ (·) (·) − ˜ (·)

2
(·)
 +
(·)
  (·) +  (·) 
By the envelope theorem, any indirect eﬀects on the optimal private choices of young labor supply
and savings are washed out. Since private agents do not internalize the eﬀect of their own health
investment on the survival probability and on the overall budget, second order eﬀects of  on the
optimal  are not eliminated. Overall, changes in public health aﬀect welfare through its direct
eﬀect on the budget and the survival probability, and indirectly, via its eﬀect on the annuity interest
rate and on private health investment (the crowding-out part). Using the first order conditions (4),
(5), and (6), we get
Υ
 =
£−(·) +  (·)¤ (·)| {z }
budget eﬀect
+
(·)
  (·) + (·)| {z }
mortality eﬀect
−
˜(·)˜(·)| {z }
interest rate eﬀect
∙
1 +


¸
| {z }
crowding-out
=
£−(·) +  (·)¤ (·) + (·)− ˜(·) (·)
∙
1 +


¸
 (10)
12See Section 4 for a discussion of the utilitarian yardstick and its implications for implementation of a public
health policy.
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where in the last step, we use (6), i.e., −(·) + (·)  (·) + (·) = 0. Using (5) and  =
− (·) we can rewrite (10) as
Υ
 = (·)
⎧
⎨
⎩
µ
1−
∙
 + 
¸ (·)

¶
| {z }−
1

(·)

∙
1 +


¸⎫⎬
⎭  (11)
A unit of funds invested in public health changes the tax revenue (both current and future); the
net benefit from this intergenerational transfer is captured by the underscored term. The second
term on the right hand side of (11) arises because public health spending changes the mortality
risk; whether it is raised or lowered depends on whether total health (private plus public) goes
up or down and whether the concomitant changes in the annuity rate helps or hurts depends on
whether the agent is a saver or a borrower. Overall, it is diﬃcult to make an overall claim about
the desirability of expanding public health.
We now turn to a narrower question: is there a welfare case for introducing public health in
an initial equilibrium with positive private health investment? As shown in Appendix A, using
(11), the marginal eﬀect on steady state welfare of introducing a small increase in public health
investment is given by
Υ

¯¯¯¯
=0
=
"
(− 1) (·) () 
[ + (·) () ] −  ˜
(·)

Ã
1 +


¯¯¯¯
=0
!#
(·) (12)
3.1. Exogenous mortality risk. We begin by considering a special, clean case in which health
investments aﬀect old-age morbidity but not the survival probability, i.e., (·) = 0 This means,
the second term in (12) drops out.
Proposition 1. If   1 and (·) = 0, then Υ |=0  0
As is clear from (12), a small increase in public health investment raises welfare at the margin
if the economy is dynamically eﬃcient. More loosely, introducing public intervention in health may
be justified if the economy is dynamically eﬃcient and mortality risk is exogenous. Note this holds
under the very general formulation of health and utility from both consumption and leisure. Also,
the net asset position of the young does not matter.
It bears emphasis that this result relies crucially on the fact that the old work and are taxed.
To see this, suppose the old work but are not taxed. Then the government’s budget constraint
becomes  =  and hence (·) = 1 and  (·) = 0 From (10), it follows that
Υ
 =
£−(·) + (·) (·)¤ (·) + (·) = £−(·)¤ 1 + (·) = 0
In other words, for Proposition 1 to hold, the intergenerational transfer mechanism has to be active.
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The intuition for this result is as follows. The private expected opportunity cost to the young
of “investing” in their own health is (·)˜ =   1. Whereas, when the current old transfer (via
taxes) some resources to the current young (in a reverse pay-as-you-go scheme) to top-up the latter’s
own health investment, the opportunity cost the old face is 1 (no population growth). Therefore, at
the margin it is cheaper to finance investments in health via the intergenerational transfer scheme
than via the market.
A bit of context for this result is in order. This result is a mirror of the classic Aaron-Samuelson
result in pension economics. In that context, introducing a pay-as-you-go pension (funded by a
lump-sum tax on the young) is welfare reducing if the economy is dynamically eﬃcient. There,
the argument is that private agents face a return on saving equal to  which, in a dynamically-
eﬃcient economy, dominates the return (unity) attainable via the public pension system (equal to
the population growth rate). The Aaron-Samuelson result shows, that in a dynamically eﬃcient
economy, it is a bad idea to save via the pension system — the intergenerational transfer mechanism,
going from the young to the old, hurts welfare. In Proposition 1, we show if saving via the
intergenerational transfer mechanism is bad, borrowing via the same scheme has to be good. The
scheme we have described, eﬀectively borrows from people whose opportunity cost of funds is 1
(under a constant population) and transfers to those whose opportunity cost is   1 and that,
we have established, is a welfare-improving move.
3.2. Endogenous mortality risk: The Philipson-Becker eﬀect. When health investments
increase the survival probability ((·)  0), the result is a lot more nuanced since “general equi-
librium” eﬀects enter the discussion. In particular, since the survival probability aﬀects the return
to annuities, the net asset position of the young starts to matter. Specifically, an increase in the
survival probability reduces the market return on life annuities; this reduces the interest burden of
borrowers (helping them) but reduces the interest income of savers (hurting them).
We repeat (12) here so as to facilitate interpreting its various terms:
Υ

¯¯¯¯
=0
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
(− 1) (·) () 
[ + (·) () ]| {z }
intergenerational transfer eﬀect
−
 ˜ (·)
Ã
1 +


¯¯¯¯
=0
!
| {z }
Philipson-Becker eﬀect
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(·) (13)
The Philipson-Becker eﬀect, the second term in parenthesis on the r.h.s. of (13), arises if private
individuals do not internalize the eﬀect of their own health investments (via the survival probability)
on the market return on life annuities. This causes  to deviate from socially optimal levels,
something the government can attempt to correct via  Because changes in  elicit changes in
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 — crowding out — the extent of this correction matters; after all, the opportunity cost attached
to  and  are very diﬀerent, 1 versus .
Specifically, we need to know, when  increases, does  = + fall or rise or stay unchanged?
It follows from (13) that if the crowding out is exactly 100%, i.e.,  (and hence, ) is unchanged,
then again we are back to the result in Proposition 1. The next lemma argues the crowding out is,
generically, never an exact 100%.
Lemma 1. 


¯¯¯
=0
6= −1 holds generically.
More generally, we need to know if the crowding out is more or less than complete (i.e., does 
rise or fall when  rises)? It turns out that an answer to this question, at the level of generality
we are operating under, is unattainable.13 Crowding out is less than complete if


¯¯¯¯
=0
= 1 +


¯¯¯¯
=0
 0 (14)
holds. This means, if (14) is true, total health investment () increases (as does the survival
probability), and the return on life annuities is reduced. We are now ready to state our main
result.
Proposition 2. Suppose (14) holds. Then a) if   1 and   0 then Υ |=0  0 holds, and
b) if   1 and   0 Υ |=0 is of ambiguous sign.
Under assumption (14), notably a suﬃcient condition, overall investment in health rises when
the public component rises (even though the private part falls, due to crowding out). Young net-
borrowers (  0) clearly benefit if public health raises  reduces the return on life annuities, and
thereby eases their interest burden. In this case, from the societal standpoint, the aforediscussed
Philipson-Becker eﬀect implies that private individuals under invest in their own health; they face
a too low survival risk, and hence, too high an interest burden on their borrowing. From (12), it
is clear that in this case, the intergenerational transfer eﬀect (the part arising from  exceeding
unity) and the Philipson-Becker eﬀect work in tandem to generate a role for public health. In fact,
when the young are net borrowers, even if the intergenerational-transfer eﬀect is shut down for some
reason, the Philipson-Becker eﬀect stays active and independently justifies public involvement in
health. This means, even at the Golden Rule, the Philipson-Becker eﬀect is enough to rationalize
public health.
13Under some restrictive assumptions, including exogenous  and  one can show that  rises when  rises at
the margin, locally near zero. A proof is available from the authors on request.
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When   0 the situation is reversed.14 Public involvement in health reduces the return on
life annuities and, ceteris paribus, this harms savers, and weakens the case for such policy action.
In this case, the aforediscussed moral-hazard problem implies that private individuals over invest in
their own health, and any additional topping-up is harmful. A clear direction for welfare cannot be
established for dynamically-eﬃcient economies; in such cases, the intergenerational-transfer eﬀect
and the Philipson-Becker eﬀect work at cross purposes.
3.3. Numerical experiments. More generally, it would be useful to know more about the
desirability of introducing or expanding public health in settings where assumption (14) is violated
or   0 To make further progress, we resort to conducting several numerical experiments.15 To
that end, assume (1) takes the commonly-used CRRA form
()1−
1−  +
(1− )1−
1−  + 
"
()1−
1−  +
(1− )1−
1− 
#
where   1 is assumed to ensure  ()  0 Also () ≡ 1+ ∈ (0 1) and  =  ≡  It is
easily verified that the relevant first order conditions are given by
 : ¡(1− ) −  − ¢− ((1− ))− (1− )− = 0
 :
h
(1− ) + ˜
i−
(1− ) − (1− )− 
 : − ¡(1− ) −  − ¢−+  (·) ˜
((1− )) 1 + ((1− ))
⎡
⎣ ((1− ))
1
³
(1− ) + ˜
´ + (1− )−
⎤
⎦ = 0
and
 : −
¡
(1− ) −  − 
¢−
+ 0 (·)
⎡
⎢⎣
³
(1− ) + ˜
´1−
1−  +
(1− )1−
1− 
⎤
⎥⎦ = 0
Also,  is computed from (8), and it is recognized that ˜ = () The above equations are
simultaneously solved to yield response functions,  ()   ()   ()  and  ()  converting
Υ into a function of 
Example 1. Suppose  = 095  = 5 and  = 11 The panel below (Figure 1) illustrates various
variables of interest as functions of  As is evident from Figure 1, the welfare-maximizing level of
 is interior.
14Philipson and Becker (1998) split time into working and non-working (retirement) periods, and impose an assump-
tion ensuring complete consumption smoothing. By implication, agents must have positive savings in the working
period.
15Obviously, our intention here is not to conduct a full-blown calibration exercise, but simply to extend the scope
of our analytical results.
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Figure 1: Example 1
Example 1 is a setting in which the young are net borrowers, and the economy is dynamically
eﬃcient. Here  falls with an increase in  so much so that total health spending,  falls; i.e.,
crowding out is more than complete. This reduces  and raises ˜ The higher public spending
requires higher tax rates. Overall, social welfare is non-monotonic in , and the optimal level of
public health investments  is positive.
Example 2. Suppose  = 05  = 5 and  = 125 The panel below (Figure 2) illustrates various
variables of interest as functions of  As is evident from Figure 2, the welfare-maximizing level of
 is interior.
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Figure 2: Example 2
Example 2 is a setting in which the young are net savers, and the economy is dynamically
eﬃcient. Here too  falls with an increase in  and total health spending falls reducing  and
raising ˜ The higher public spending requires higher tax rates. Overall, social welfare is again
non-monotonic in , and the optimal level of public health investments  is positive.
4. Concluding remarks
Public intervention in health is important and ubiquitous. Most often, it is rationalized by appealing
to a host of market failures or distributional concerns. In this paper, we demonstrate that a role for
government in preventive health activities may exist in their absence. We use a two-period model
of endogenous mortality and morbidity inspired by Philipson and Becker (1998). Young agents
invest a portion of labor income in their own health. Such investments reduce both mortality risk
and old-age morbidity as well as improve general well-being. Public health activities are financed
in a pay-as-you-go scheme where the government uses a distortionary tax on the labor income of
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the young and the old to finance spending on the young. Perfect substitutability of private and
public investment in health is assumed, as is existence of competitive mortality-contingent claims
“life-annuity” markets and dynamic eﬃciency. In such a setting, on the flip side of the classic
Aaron-Samuelson result in pension economics, we prove that if survival risk is exogenous, then
public intervention in health may be justified if the economy is dynamically eﬃcient.16 If survival
risk is endogenous, and private agents do not internalize the eﬀect of their health investments on
the survival probability, they may over or underinvest in health — the Philipson-Becker eﬀect. We
show if the young are net borrowers this eﬀect strengthens the case for public health.
Our justification for using steady-state welfare as the yardstick is simple: if a policy fails to
generate long-run welfare gains, it is unlikely to be ever adopted. However, despite our demon-
stration of the steady-state welfare gains, it may be questioned whether such an arrangement can
ever be implemented in the short run (gotten oﬀ the ground). We have shown, when survival
risk is exogenous, it is the intergenerational transfer mechanism that is essential to generating a
welfare rationale for public health.17 In the language of Rangel (2003), the activity we consider is
a forward-looking intergenerational good, one that is passed along an intergenerational link going
forward from generation  to generation  + 1. For such a scheme to be implemented, there has
to exist a first generation of old who contribute to it without having received any public health
investment in their youth. Unless agents are altruistic, it appears our scheme cannot be imple-
mented. However, as Rangel (2003) shows, implementation may be possible via a trigger strategy
if the forward-looking intergenerational good is bundled with a backward-looking intergenerational
good (passed on from generation  + 1 to generation ) as happens with a pay-as-you-go pension.
The intuition is that the support from generation  for the forward-looking transfer to generation
+ 1 is ensured since their old-age pension is contingent on this support. Specifically, in our con-
text, support for health (a forward-looking good) can presumably be ensured by bundling it with
a backward-looking pension.18
16The main mechanism considered is not limited to health investment; indeed it applies (with some adjustments)
to all expenditures made early in life that yield benefits later, such as education.
17Concerns about implementation do not arise when survival risk is endogenous. In that case, the Philipson-Becker,
moral-hazard eﬀect is operative. Even if the intergenerational transfer eﬀect is shut down, public involvement in health
may be justified for each and every generation if it ameliorates the moral hazard. The added nuance is that welfare
eﬀects depend on whether the young are net borrowers or savers.
18This intuition is readily transferred to the present setting with a minor reinterpretation of the model. Split
up the period we have denoted old into middle-aged and retired and consider the following implementation of our
health program. The middle-aged work and contribute to the financing of health which benefits the next generation.
However, if the contribution to health is linked to a pension (received when retired) there is a linkage allowing trigger
strategies to work. Current middle-aged will get a pension by the next generation only if they have contributed to
the financing of health.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1
We evaluate the marginal social value of increasing public health activities near  =  = 0. First,
note that
(·)

¯¯¯¯
=0
=
1
[ + () () ] 
Using that  (·) = −(·) ()  we have
£−(·) + (·) (·)¤ (·)
¯¯¯¯
=0
+ (·) = −
£(·) + (·)(·) () ¤
[ + (·) () ] + (·)
= (·)
∙
(− 1) (·) () 
[ + (·) () ]
¸
where −(·) +(·) = 0 has been used. We thus have
Υ
 |=0 = (− 1)
(·) () (·)
[ + (·) () ] − ˜(·)
(·)
((·))2(·)
µ
1 +


¶
(15)
which is identical to (12). For a dynamically-eﬃcient economy (  1), the first term is unambigu-
ously positive, while the second term is ambiguously signed. If (·) = 0 then clearly Υ |=0∀  1
B. Proof of Lemma 1
The following first shows that the equilibrium to the model can be stated in terms of total health
expenditures () and the tax rate () and then turns to the crowding out issue. To recap, the
model is summarized by the following first order conditions
( 1− )− ˜( 1−  ()) = 0 (16)
−1−( 1− ) + ˜( 1−  ()) [1−  ] = 0 (17)
()( 1−  ()) (18)
+()
∙
( 1−  ())
µ
[1−  ]  ()

  − ˜
¶
+ ( 1−  ())
¸
= 0
( 1−  ()) [1−  ] ()− 1−( 1−  ()) = 0 (19)
and the budget constraint determining old age consumption
 = [1−  ] + ˜
= [1−  ] + ˜ [ + (·) ()  −  − ] 
where
 =  + (·) () 
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Using the expression for 0 the equation system (16)-(19) can be rewritten in implicit form as
1(z0 ) = 0 (20)
2(z0 ) = 0 (21)
3(z0 ) = 0 (22)
4(z0 ) = 0 (23)
where z0 ≡ (1 2 3 4) ≡ (   ). Note that all other exogenous variables than  have been
left out and that the level of public health is endogenously determined via the budget constraint.
Total diﬀerentiation of the equation system (20)-(23) yields Az = −B where
A ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
11 12 13 14
21 22 23 24
31 32 33 34
41 42 43 44
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
; B ≡
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
2
3
4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and  ≡ () 6= 0 for all   and  ≡ () 6= 0 for all .
It follows from Cramer’s rule that

 =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
11 12 13 1
21 22 23 2
31 32 33 3
41 42 43 4
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
|A| =
|A1|
|A| 6= 0
Note that |A| 6= 0 is implied by existence of equilibrium.  6= 0 requires that A1 is non singular,
|A1| 6= 0, which holds generically. This implies |=0 6= 0 and hence

 |=0 6= −1
